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2 budget concerns. They provide "command intent" focused on reducing expenditures through reversible actions so as to not affect readiness if the budgetary situation improves. Some of the actions directed in the memorandum include: 1) an Army-wide hiring freeze; 2) termination of temporary employees; 3) curtailing temporary duty and training; 4) limiting conferences; 5) limiting administrative expenses and supply purchases; and, 6) reviewing contracts for cost savings.
The grave predictions and draconian cost-saving measures presented above provide sobering clarity to the Army's upcoming budgetary challenges. While sequestration is a worst-case scenario that may not come to pass, the fact remains that shrinking budgets, broad austerity measures, and closer scrutiny of spending can be expected for the foreseeable future. One ramification of this new reality is that all spending is now strategic. This extends well beyond the zero-sum nature of the budget allocation process. The strategic implications for the Army's budget now includes the specter of a credibility gap if fiscal excesses negatively impact efforts by senior pentagon officials to ensure appropriate funding levels to maintain strategic capabilities.
It is against this backdrop of dwindling resources, greater scrutiny, and the strategic implications of budgetary decisions that this paper will address current Department of the Army (DA) efforts to ensure fiscal prudence in one sector of its discretionary spending -conference expenses. Through a review of the events that led to changes in the military's conference policies, as well as Army-specific attempts to rein in conference spending, the efficacy of the Army's current policies will be examined.
Based on this examination, an argument will be made for a comprehensive framework to ensure a change in the Army's fiscal culture that can be applied throughout DoD and the whole of government.
Conference Spending Faces Scrutiny
On December 27, 2010, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a memorandum entitled, "Consideration of Costs in DoD Decision-Making." 7 Although focused on all types of DoD spending, the memorandum emphasized the particular need to provide transparency by calculating government costs associated with attending, sponsoring, or hosting conferences. To facilitate the new requirement, DoD created an on-line tool that quickly calculates the cost of conferences. 8 The tool was made accessible to all DoD employees through the Common Access Card to ensure the widest possible usage.
Less then four months after the Gates memorandum was issued, the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) hosted a conference so fundamentally flawed that it prompted senior Army officials to mandate a series of policy changes designed to reign in excessive conference expenditures and regulatory violations. IMCOM's four-day
Commander's Conference was held in San Antonio, Texas, in April 2011. With over eighteen hundred attendees and costs exceeding $4 million, the conference became the subject of an anonymous Inspector General complaint. 9 In addition to issues related to the cost and scope of the conference, it was determined that the conference failed to comply with defense travel and contracting regulations, as well as ethical guidelines.
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Those violations specifically addressed included: 1) failure to use a warranted contracting officer; 2) failure to consider three geographic locations and three venues; 3) the use of a venue contracted for by a non-federal entity (The Association of the United
States Army (AUSA)); 4) paying for attendees meals; and, 5) approving the payment of 4 $500 to AUSA for each Army attendee to hear three speakers, all of whom were Army personnel.
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The reaction to the excesses of the IMCOM conference was swift. On April 20, Pursuant to the policy, for conferences with total costs greater than or equal to $500,000, approval authority rests with the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (AASA). For conferences costing less than $500,000, approval authority rests with commanders of major Army commands, Army service component commands, and direct reporting units for conferences sponsored or funded by their respective commands. The policy also provides for delegation of this approval authority to a general officer or SES who is a principal deputy of the approval authority. And for those conferences greater than or equal to $25,000, but less than $100,000, delegation to the first general officer or SES in the chain of the command is authorized.
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With the implementation of Directive 2011-20, it appeared that senior level guidance to rein in Army conference spending was now complete; however, in less then six months the landscape again would change. This time, it was a conference outside the DoD that resulted in action by senior government officials.
In April of 2012, the Inspector General of the General Service Administration (GSA) issued a report on the organization's Western Regions Conference. 19 The
November 2010 event, held in Las Vegas, immediately garnered wide-spread coverage by national media, to include Articles in The Washington Post, 20 
Government
Executive, 21 and The New York Times. 22 National interest in the taxpayer-funded conference grew more intense as reports surfaced that the "over-the-top" conference cost $822,000 and featured a clown, a mind reader, a $75,000 team-building exercise, and $7,000 in sushi. 23 Congressional interest soon led to a hearing conducted by conferences. Specifically, the memorandum requires the Deputy Secretaries of all executive departments and agencies, or their equivalent, to review all planned and future conferences which exceed $100,000 in net costs to ensure that "no funds are used for unnecessary or inappropriate purposes…" 27 In addition, the memorandum specially prohibits single conferences with costs in excess of $500,000 unless the agency head requests a waiver. To obtain a waiver, the agency head must determine that, "exceptional circumstances exist whereby spending in excess of $500,000 on a single conference is the most cost-effective option to achieve a compelling purpose." 28 Of particular interest was the manner in which transparency was mandated in the new OMB policy.
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Beginning in 2013, the OMB policy requires agency heads to publish reports on the prior fiscal year's conferences in excess of $100,000. The policy requires that these reports be placed on a dedicated location on each agency's official website by January thirty-first of each year. Moreover, for all conferences in excess of $500,000, agency heads also must include the waiver they submitted in order to obtain permission to conduct the conference. Officer (DCMO) and conferences above $500,000 will be submitted through the DCMO for Dr. Carter's personal approval, if warranted. 31 In the midst of these ongoing attempts to rein in government spending on conferences, two events provided even greater impetus for DoD leaders to change "business as usual." In the first instance, although not related to a conference, the Inspector General report on the travel expenses of Major General (MG) William E. Ward again cast a spotlight on Army spending excesses. 32 In a memorandum released on comprehensive and detailed guidance to date. 37 In superseding the memorandum of conferences. In addition to planning purposes, the endorsement serves as confirmation from the signee that the conferences listed are a necessary and cost-effective way to achieve a particular mission objective. As presented above, the DoD and DA framework for curtailing conference expenditures focuses on three major areas of emphasis: 1) detailed guidance on costs, contracting, and ethical considerations; 2) a graduated system of senior level review based on total conference expenses; and 3) the chilling effect transparency brings to excessive spending. The end result should be the elimination of unnecessary conferences, prudent spending on those conferences that remain, and increased confidence in DoD and DA as good stewards of taxpayer dollars. Although these goals may be achieved through directives and policies, is it correct to say that a cultural change toward fiscal prudence necessarily will follow? Or is it more likely that we will 13 see forced compliance based on fear of senior leader or public condemnation? If the directives and policies in question are revoked, how confident are we that similar excesses soon would not follow? If confidence is low, then actions beyond senior leader oversight and transparency are necessary, which again brings us to the leadership philosophies of Kotter and Gerstner.
In addition to the lack of urgency addressed above, Kotter lists additional factors that prevent leaders from achieving cultural change: 1) underestimating the power of vision; 2) under-communicating the vision; and, 3) neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the organization's culture." 52 Gerstner, while advocating crystal-clear messages, advises leaders that great execution is more than simply exhortation and message. He believes that it flows naturally from values and commitments instead of from procedures and rule books. 53 Based on these criteria for success, the Army falls short of the requisite elements necessary to bring about the cultural change it seeks. Instead of Kotter's oft-communicated vision that anchors a set of values firmly in the organization, the Army limited its approach to the very rules and procedures mentality Gerstner urges leaders to avoid.
While it is clear that the Army was required to take immediate prescriptive steps to prevent further abuses, nothing in the mandates of OMB or DoD prevent the Army from adopting a comprehensive approach to place the desired cultural change on a more sustainable footing. The first step in doing so requires a realistic assessment of the root of the problem instead of simply addressing its symptoms. Because the cultural change the Army seeks is based on curbing fiscal excess, a good starting point is an honest examination of the inefficiencies inherent in government spending. 54 In a chapter broadly addressing social welfare programs, Friedman presented the four categories of spending, from the most to the least efficient.
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The most efficient way to spend money, according to Friedman, is to spend your money on yourself. This category, Category I, is efficient because "you clearly have a strong incentive both to economize and to get as much value as you can for each dollar you do spend." 56 Spending your money on someone else encompasses the second category of spending. For this category, Friedman explains the drop in efficiency is due to the fact that, "you have the same incentive to economize as in Category I but not the same incentive to get full value for your money." 57 Thus, in Friedman's model, the two most efficient ways to spend money share one trait, the fact that you are spending your money and therefore have a strong incentive to economize. As presented below, this incentive is absent in the two least efficient spending categories.
Friedman's third category involves spending someone else's money on you. The decreased efficiency in Category III is due to the fact that while you have an incentive to get the most value for your money, you have no strong incentive to keep down costs. 58 As can logically be inferred, the least efficient way to spend money is spending someone else's money on another person. For Friedman, Category IV, which comprises most government spending, is the least efficient way to spend money because you have little incentive to economize or obtain great value for what you spend. 61 Veteran's Administration, 62 and the other services 63 have all been implicated in wasteful government spending on conferences.
If we are to limit such excesses, the ultimate value of Freidman's model lies in its ability to logically demonstrate why government profligacy can unfortunately be expected. In providing a simple explanation of the existence or absence of incentives inherent in every spending decision, the model is, in effect, the problem statement.
Therefore, attempts to truly change "business as usual" must take into consideration the 
Understanding Tipping Points
In his best-selling book Tipping Point, author Malcolm Gladwell uses the example of crime in the New York subway system to explain how little changes can have big effects. 64 In Tipping Point, Gladwell highlights the "Broken Windows" theory first espoused by criminologists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. The theory asserts that crime is an inevitable result of disorder. Broken windows beget more broken windows, which leads to graffiti, an increase in small crime, then eventually more serious crime. Eventually a general malaise develops that culminates in an attitude that "anything goes." 65 To counter the "epidemic theory of crime," Gladwell argues that authorities need to alter the environment that makes illegal conduct acceptable. He then provides an example of the theory in action using the New York Transit Authority's (NYTA) efforts to reduce crime over the ten-year period from 1984 to 1994.
In the mid-1980s, the NYTA hired George Kelling as a consultant and he immediately put his theory into practice. Working with the new subway director, David Gunn, the two sought to reduce crime by systematically changing the environment instead of focusing solely on major crimes. Believing that, "graffiti was symbolic of the collapse of the system," Gunn implemented a program to have cars on each subway line cleaned in a methodical fashion. If graffiti appeared on new cars or previously cleaned cars, they would be kept from use until they were cleaned. The message to the graffiti artists was clear; their work will never see the light of day and therefore they are wasting their time and money attempting to deface subway transit cars. 66 Once the NYTA cleaned up the appearance of subway cars, they went after the lowest level of crime in the subway system -fare-beating.
In the 1980s, it was estimated that 170,000 people a day were entering the NYTA system without paying. Like graffiti, it was considered another form of disorder that invited more serious crime. To combat the signal that lawlessness was permitted, the head of the transit police, William Bratton, instituted an aggressive policy of arresting fare-beaters. Officers began arresting fare-beaters and keeping them on the subway platform, handcuffed together, to create "daisy chains" of petty criminals. In addition to sending a clear message to the public, the arrests often had the additional benefit of apprehending more serious criminals. Officers who originally were reluctant to pursue such minor crimes found that one in seven arrestees had an outstanding warrant and one in twenty was carrying a concealed weapon. 67 As Gladwell explains, the same reduction in serious crime witnessed by the NYTA when they addressed graffiti and fare-beating was present when New York City applied the "Broken Windows" theory to the entire city. In 1994, New York City Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani appointed Bratton as Chief of Police. He immediately began prosecuting the above-ground equivalents of graffiti and fare-beating with the same vigor as the NYTA. Public drunkenness, urinating in public, littering, and minor property crimes all resulted in arrest. The reduction in serious crime that followed led Bratton and Giuliani to draw the same conclusion; crime drops dramatically when minor quality-oflife crimes are aggressively prosecuted because turning a blind eye to such lesser violations of the law creates a tipping point for more violent offenses. 68 In terms of tipping points, the graffiti, fare-beating, and quality-of-life crimes focused on by New York City authorities are similar to the waste inherent in Category III and IV spending. In the same way tolerating minor crimes creates a mindset that leads to more serious crime, the failure to address the realities of Category III and IV spending leads to a mindset that fiscal excesses are either permitted or excusable. Although the Army's new conference policies address this mindset, the manner in which they do is equivalent to a parent regulating every purchase of a spendthrift child instead of teaching him or her fiscal prudence. Senior leader oversight is necessary based on political realities, but mere oversight is not enough. For long-term success, the Army must implement a comprehensive strategy designed to change its culture by addressing the root of the problem and the tipping point it creates.
Leading Cultural Change
In addition to the principles espoused above by Kotter, Gerstner, and Baldoni, another model for implementing sustainable culture change can be found in the writings of Edgar H. Schein. In one of his early books on the subject, Schein defined culture as:
A pattern of basic assumptions -invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration -that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. 69 Over fifteen years and four editions of his book on culture and organizational leadership, Schein advanced specific principles for leading cultural change by influencing basic assumptions. In Schein's view, assumptions are deeply embedded, unconscious, nonnegotiable, and taken-for-granted behaviors that constitute the essence of culture. 70 These assumptions are so well-ingrained in culture that they are not observable or subject to direct change; however, they are subject to indirect change. failure to exhaust an entire budget will result in a smaller budget the following fiscal year; 6) if an organization fails to exhaust its budget, another organization will benefit; and, 7) we have always spent money this way so it must be right.
Once a comprehensive list of negative assumptions is agreed upon, senior Army leaders can use the primary and secondary mechanisms identified by Schein to alter those assumptions. While it is clear that many of these mechanisms have been used to date, the focus has been on the first and second primary mechanisms of "attention, measure, control, and react to critical incidents." To be successful, a greater emphasis must be placed on primary mechanisms such as "deliberate role modeling, teaching, coaching, and allocating rewards." The belief that the emphasis must be at the user- Under the current evaluation systems in the Army, only non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and civilian employees below the grade of G-9 are evaluated on fiscal prudence. 79 Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs) and senior civilian evaluations are void of any mandate to provide comments evaluating fiscal responsibility. 80 Whether through actual changes to the OER and senior civilian evaluation forms, or a requirement to address fiscal prudence in objectives and comments, the Army must change its culture by holding senior leaders accountable in the same way we hold our NCOs and junior civilians. By correcting the message this Artifact sends to the Army's most senior personnel, we reinforce the primary embedding mechanisms of teaching and coaching and enhance the most important embedding mechanisms -the ability to select, promote, and reward those who display fiscal prudence.
Conclusion
The credibility of the Army and its leaders is at stake with every spending decision that is made. No longer can we justify platinum-plating gold bars by referring to the amount in questions as "Budget Dust." In the zero-sum budgetary environment of decreasing appropriations, fiscal prudence entails maximizing the value derived from every dollar spent instead of minimizing its proportion to the overall budget. The steps taken by OMB, DoD, and the Secretary of the Army to limit conference spending attest to this fact. The policies now in place, while labor-intensive, will prevent future credibility-draining headlines. But as argued above, these policies alone are not enough to permanently change the Army's culture of fiscal profligacy. This can only be accomplished through a comprehensive plan dedicated to changing the organizational Artifacts, Espoused Beliefs and Values, and assumptions that lead to fiscal imprudence.
If successfully implemented, the corresponding cultural change will influence spending across the Army and may serve as a model for other services and agencies throughout government.
